READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

An answer booklet is provided inside this question paper. You should follow the instructions on the front cover of the answer booklet. If you need additional answer paper ask the invigilator for a continuation booklet.

This paper contains three sections:
Section A: European Option
Section B: American Option
Section C: International Option

Answer both parts of the question from one section only.

The marks are given in brackets [ ] at the end of each part question.
Section A: European Option

Liberalism and Nationalism in Italy and Germany, 1815–1871

Bismarck and Austria

1. Read the sources and then answer both parts of the question.

Source A

Vienna’s policy has made Germany suddenly too small for us both. Austria is reluctant to make any concession to the great progress that Prussia has made in recent decades and sees itself as the dominant power and the source of authority in Germany. We have a great number of conflicting interests which neither of us can give up without renouncing the mission in which each believes for itself. They are, therefore, conflicts which cannot be peacefully unravelled by diplomatic correspondence. I do not intend, by this reasoning, to reach the conclusion that we should immediately direct our policy to bringing about the decision between Austria and ourselves. I see it as unlikely that Austria will change in any way. I only wish to express my conviction that we shall be obliged, sooner or later, to fight Austria for our existence and that it does not lie in our power to evade the fight.

Bismarck to Manteuffel, The Prussian Prime Minister, 1856.

Source B

We have now reached a point where the alternatives are self-evident: whether it is advisable for Württemberg to renew the Zollverein with Prussia or to strive for a customs union with Austria. Each of those two powers, on account of its particular economic and financial interests, is going to exert itself to obstruct and weaken the other's influence over the rest of the Zollverein states and to try and force the other out entirely. There seems to be no chance of any reasonable agreement between the two.

The Minister-President of Württemberg, 1865.

Source C

So far the differences between Austria and Prussia have been limited to their Cabinets. They have now been transplanted to the field of public opinion as a result of Prussia's use of the press and the public criticism of our nation. Count Bismarck thinks that the time has come to mount a great Prussian action abroad and, if it can be done in no other way, to go to war. Such an action has been the goal from the beginning of his political career. It would satisfy his ungoverned and daring thirst for achievement. After such a success, especially if it were attained by means of a fortunate war, the Prussian government would more easily master its internal strife. The only means he has of bringing about a sudden change internally must thus be sought in the field of foreign policy. The diversion of a war is vital to Bismarck's internal policy. How far Count Bismarck has succeeded, or will succeed, in winning over the Prussian King to his extreme policy is precisely the question on which his whole future depends. A forcible solution does not appeal to the King.

The Austrian ambassador in Prussia, to the Austrian Foreign Minister, February 1866.
Source D

With regard to the threatening attitude which Prussia has taken in the Schleswig-Holstein affair, His Majesty asked whether we should look calmly on at these demonstrations or whether the honour, dignity and security of Austria demand that warlike preparations should be made. Count Esterhazy said that we must show our teeth. It was the task of our diplomacy so that our allies in the Germanic confederation could have no doubt at all about our views and conduct. The Finance Minister and the Minister for Trade, however, urged a peaceful solution.

Minutes of a meeting between the Austrian Ministers and the Emperor Franz Josef, February 1866.

Answer both parts of the question with reference to the sources.

(a) To what extent do Sources A and C agree on Bismarck’s views on conflict with Austria? [15]

(b) How far do Sources A to D show that Prussia was responsible for the war with Austria? [25]
Section B: American Option

The Origins of the Civil War, 1846–1861

Kansas after the Kansas-Nebraska Act: Slave or Free?

2 Read the sources and then answer both parts of the question.

Source A

The repeal of the Missouri restriction, in relieving the South of a hateful badge of inferiority, was a triumph. The abolitionists were not disheartened by their defeat but were rather stimulated to renewed energy and more desperate effort. They saw how they might wring victory from the grasp of the South and they set about the work with characteristic ingenuity and contempt of honest principle. All the vagabonds, paupers and discharged convicts who infested the Northern cities were shipped out to Kansas. The issue before the people of the South is simply this: shall we remain the spectators of the struggle in Kansas until the gallant spirits from Missouri are crushed by a horde of barbarians from the North? In the name of the people of Virginia we respond with an unhesitating and emphatic No.

*From the Richmond ‘Enquirer’ (Virginia), 18 April 1856.*

Source B

Will Kansas be a free state? We answer No. Not while the existing Union stands. Its fate is settled. We shall briefly state the reasons which force us to this sad conclusion.

1. The South is united in its determination to make Kansas a slave state. She has never yet failed in her purpose thus concentrated and expressed.

2. Eastern emigration will avail nothing to keep slavery out of Kansas.

3. The omnipotent power of the federal government will cooperate with the vandals of Missouri to crush what little anti-slavery sentiment may exist in Kansas. This will prove decisive in the struggle.

4. There are no Kansas newspapers desirous of making it a free state.

*From ‘The Liberator’, 1 June 1856.*
Source C

Can Kansas be made a slave state? Thus far the pro-slavery party has triumphed in Kansas in spite of the abolitionists and their emigrant aid societies. They have raised their millions of money and sent upon us their hordes of fools, armed with Sharpe’s rifles, to trample down our institutions and confiscate our property and drive us from the country. Yet we have peaceably whipped them at the polls, forced them to beg for mercy on the battlefield and proven to the world that truth and justice are on our side. And all this has been accomplished by the hardy squatters without any aid from the South, save now and again a straggling ‘border ruffian’ from Missouri. What then is in the way of making Kansas a slave state? Nothing can prevent it if the southern people do but half their duty. But they must do that or Kansas will be lost and the Union dissolved.

From ‘Debow’s Review’, New Orleans (Louisiana), June 1856.

Source D

We secured the freedom of Kansas while the slaveholders had every possible advantage in the contest. They had full control of every department of the government and were in force on the border of the territory while our emigrants had to make a journey of many hundreds of miles, much through the slave state of Missouri. By the Plan of Freedom adopted by the Emigrant Aid Company, Kansas was made free – very decidedly free – so that when admitted to the Union there was no slave party within her borders. No man, unless he be ignorant of the facts of the Kansas struggle or completely blinded by malice or envy, will ever attempt to defraud the Emigrant Aid Society of the glory of having saved Kansas by defeating the Slave Power in a great and decisive contest.

From ‘The Kansas Crusade’ by Eli Thayer, founder of the Emigrant Aid Society, 1889.

Answer both parts of the question with reference to the sources.

(a) To what extent do Sources B and C agree about the reasons why Kansas would become a slave state? [15]

(b) How far do Sources A to D support the assertion that the Pro-Slavery forces had only themselves to blame for their failure to make Kansas a slave state? [25]
3 Read the sources and then answer both parts of the question.

Source A

In 1919, I was a member of the Committee which framed the Covenant, and I well remember the high and noble ideals to which all our thoughts were directed after the terrible ordeals of the War. The disappointment we experience today is bitter. The League is faced with a crisis, demonstrated by the abandonment of sanctions in the Abyssinian dispute. The League can only act by the agreement of its members. It is on the resolve of the Great States for collaboration and peace that the action of the League depends. The League will not be capable of accomplishing its mission so long as the Great States remain bound by rivalries, suspicions, threats and ambitions. Collective security presents evident weaknesses. Nations will hesitate long before going to war over a dispute in which their vital interests are not at stake. The little states remain deeply attached to the League. It is necessary, then, to maintain, defend and consolidate the League. We should not change the Covenant or call its principles into question. We must effect the necessary improvements by a more realistic application of the system of collective security.

From an article by the Belgian politician Paul Hymans, 1936.

Source B

Collective security has been tried out and it has failed. There is no reason why, because the policy of collective security has failed, we should abandon the idea of the League and give up the ideals for which the League stands. But if we have retained any vestige of common sense, surely we must admit that we have tried to impose upon the League a task which was beyond its powers to fulfil. Member nations should review the situation and decide to limit the functions of the League. I believe that this might go far to restore the prestige of the League and the moral influence which it ought to exert in the world. But if the League were to be limited in this way, it must be admitted that it could no longer be relied upon by itself to secure the peace of the world.

From a speech by Neville Chamberlain, British Prime Minister, 1936.

Source C

The framers of the Covenant saw that it would be foolish to create a super-state to override national governments. They rejected the idea, much favoured in France, of a League army or police, or of any other method by which a member state might be compelled to bow to the League’s will. Rather than violate in any way the sovereign rights of nation states, the founders were prepared that their League should be an association of countries, each protected from invasion of its domestic prerogatives by the requirement that any decisions of the League should receive unanimous assent. The League of Nations can be no better than the member states of which it is composed. If they wish for peace, the League provides machinery by which peace may be the better secured and maintained, but League or no League, a state which is resolved on war can always have it.

Source D

Cartoon from a British newspaper, 1938.

Answer **both** parts of the question with reference to the sources.

(a) Compare and contrast the views of Sources A and B about collective security. [15]  
(b) ‘In the period from 1936 to 1938, it became clear that the League of Nations could never succeed.’ How far do Sources A to D support this view? [25]