READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

An answer booklet is provided inside this question paper. You should follow the instructions on the front cover of the answer booklet. If you need additional answer paper ask the invigilator for a continuation booklet.

This paper contains three sections:
Section A: Topic 1 The Causes and Impact of British Imperialism, c. 1850–1939
Section B: Topic 2 The Holocaust
Section C: Topic 3 The Origins and Development of the Cold War, 1941–1950

Answer the question on the topic you have studied.

At the end of the examination, fasten all your work securely together. The marks are given in brackets [ ] at the end of each question.
The Causes and Impact of British Imperialism, c.1850–1939

1 Read the extract and then answer the question.

Wherever the British sought to plant their flag, they met with opposition. In almost every colony they had to fight their way ashore. While they could sometimes count on a handful of friends and allies, they never arrived as welcome guests, for the expansion of empire was nearly always conducted as a military operation. The initial opposition continued off and on, and in varying forms, in almost every colonial territory until independence. To retain control the British were obliged to establish systems of oppression on a global scale, both brutal and sophisticated. These in turn created new outbreaks of revolt.

A self-satisfied belief survives in Britain that the Empire was an imaginative, civilising enterprise, reluctantly undertaken, that brought the benefits of modern society to backward peoples. Indeed it is often suggested that the British Empire was something of a model experience, unlike that of the French, the Dutch, the Germans, the Spaniards, the Portuguese – or, of course, the Americans. There is a widespread opinion that the British Empire was obtained and maintained with a minimum degree of force and with maximum cooperation from a grateful indigenous population. This benign, romanticised view of the past is not an understanding of their history that young people in the territories that once made up the Empire would now recognise. New generations have been recovering tales of rebellion, repression and resistance that make nonsense of the accepted imperial version of what went on. Focusing on resistance has been a way of challenging not just the traditional, self-indulgent view of the Empire, but also the customary depiction of the colonised as victims, lacking in agency or political will.

Throughout the period of the British Empire, the British were for the most part loathed and despised by those they colonised. While a thin crust of colonial society in the Empire – princes, bureaucrats, settlers, mercenary soldiers – often gave open support to the British, the majority of the people always held the colonial occupiers in contempt and made their views plain whenever the opportunity arose. Resistance, revolt and rebellion were permanent facts of empire and the imperial power, endlessly challenged, was tireless in its repression. The sullen passivity, for most of the time, of the mass of the population gave a true indication of popular feeling. Individual murder, killings and assassination were sometimes the simplest responses that poor people could summon up to express their resentment of their alien conquerors, yet the long story of empire is littered with large-scale outbreaks of rage and fury, suppressed with great brutality.

For much of its history, the British Empire was run as a military dictatorship. Colonial governors were often military men who imposed martial law whenever trouble threatened. ‘Special’ courts and courts martial were set up to deal with dissidents, and handed out speedy injustice. Normal judicial procedures were replaced by rule through terror; resistance was crushed, rebellion suffocated. The drive towards the annihilation of dissidents and peoples in twentieth-century Europe certainly had precedents in the nineteenth-century imperial operations in the colonial world, where the elimination of ‘inferior’ peoples was seen by some to be historically inevitable, and where the experience helped in the construction of the racist ideologies that arose subsequently in Europe.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the British Empire to explain your answer.
The confidential Führer decree which authorised Himmler to ‘eliminate’ alien population groups without actually spelling out the details was in essence already no longer a decree on organisation but a command to fight and to destroy, delivered to a special group suited to this end. This sort of command, in so far as the content was kept secret from the regular organs of administration or could be disguised, was likely to be most easily carried out when a special group directly subordinate to the Führer was available, and which was tightly organised enough for the execution of the secret measures to take place without any particular attempt to inform and to involve the normal state organs. In Germany there was much less guarantee of maintaining secrecy or suppressing news about local measures of coercion than there was among the police-controlled population of Poland. The fact that the euthanasia action had to be abandoned in 1941 because complaints from the public, the judiciary and the administration multiplied, can be viewed as evidence of the fact that constitutional developments in the Führer state had not yet gone far enough within Germany itself for such actions to take place without friction.

This experience undoubtedly contributed to the fact that the mass murder of the Jews was shifted to remote Polish and Soviet Russian areas and to the especially enlarged jurisdiction which Himmler possessed there. A small circle of SS leaders was fully informed, sworn to secrecy and authorised to act with specific reference to the ‘effect of law’ of the Führer's will. Apart from this, other offices were only partially informed and involved. The emergency apparatus directly responsible to the Führer represented by the Security Police and the SS had become big enough and sufficiently independent to take charge of carrying out the mass crimes. The offices of the state administration which were still bound by the law were sufficiently split up and largely stripped of their security and self-confidence, and accordingly had become susceptible to manipulation. This was because of the lasting effects of competition with authorities directly subordinate to the Führer, through the infiltration of party personnel, ideological training etc. Thus they could be assigned what were often partly technical, legislative and executive functions (without being fully informed of the ultimate aims of the leadership) necessary to the development of the overall process of the final solution of the Jewish question.

This criminal mass destruction of the Jews must not be seen simply as the continuation of the legal discrimination against Jews after 1933. Procedurally this was in fact a break with former practice and in that respect had a different quality. All the same, the previous laws and decrees which step by step had further discriminated against the Jews in Germany, had subjected them to emergency laws and had condemned them to a social ghetto, paved the way for the final solution. The progressive undermining of the principle of law through measures cast in legal form finally resulted in an utterly crude, lawless, criminal action.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Holocaust to explain your answer. [40]
3 Read the extract and then answer the question.

There were four major assumptions on which the United States built its initial post-World War II policy. Washington officials first assumed that foreign policy grew directly from domestic policy; American actions abroad did not respond primarily to the pressures of other nations, but to political, social and economic forces at home. Policy-makers would consider the economic the most important of these forces, not unreasonably given the ghosts of the Great Depression. These ghosts led to a second assumption. The economic dislocations of the 1930s had inexorably led to political conflicts which had ignited World War II. Free flow of exports and imports was therefore essential. Third, the USA, quadrupling its production whilst other nations suffered severe wartime damage, wielded the required economic power to establish this desired world economic community. Finally, Washington determined to use this power; the USA would not sit on the sidelines. American officials hoped that this process would occur through the United Nations, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. American economic power necessarily made the USA the dominant force in these organisations.

With considerably more brutality and less regard for the formalities of the United Nations Charter, Stalin constructed his post-war policy upon the necessity of maintaining freedom of action in spheres he considered vital for Soviet economic and strategic requirements. America's open-world diplomacy crashed against Stalin's iron curtain. Regardless of threats, whether economic or atomic, Stalin had reasons for not lifting the curtain. The Soviet peoples and leaders alike viewed almost everything in their lives through the memories of the horrors that struck from 1941 to 1945. Stalin's objectives were accomplished by the Red Army's occupation and consequent communisation of Eastern Europe. Ideology and personal ambition partly explained Stalin's policies in this area. But the overriding requirement was the Soviets' need for security and economic reconstruction. Here Stalin's dilemma became strikingly evident. If he wished quick economic reconstruction, he would need American funds, since the United States possessed the only sufficient capital supply in the world. To obtain those funds, however, Stalin would have to loosen his control of Eastern Europe, allow American political and economic power to flow into the area, and consequently surrender what he considered to be the first essential of Soviet security. However, through absolute control of Eastern Europe, Stalin might obtain both security and, through forced seizures from those economies, the economic resources needed for Soviet reconstruction. Russia had lost one quarter of her capital equipment, 1700 towns, 70,000 villages, nearly 100,000 collective farms and more than 20 million dead during World War II. In 1945 Soviet steel production sunk to only one-eighth the amount of American production. Stalin imposed a communist system over Eastern Europe not because of ideology, but because, in the Russians' view, both their security and economic requirements could be found in such a system.

For American policy makers dedicated to creating a Western democratic world built on the Atlantic Charter Freedoms, Stalin's moves posed the terrible problem of how to open the Soviet empire without alienating the Soviets. Given their assumptions of how the post-war world must work, Washington officials had little choice but to attempt to stop the descent of the curtain around Stalin's domains. Otherwise the world would be divided, as in the late 1930s, into separate and hostile blocs. In these dilemmas lay the roots of the Cold War.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Cold War to explain your answer.

[40]