READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

An answer booklet is provided inside this question paper. You should follow the instructions on the front cover of the answer booklet. If you need additional answer paper ask the invigilator for a continuation booklet.

This paper contains three sections:
Section A: Topic 1 The Causes and Impact of British Imperialism, c. 1850–1939
Section B: Topic 2 The Holocaust
Section C: Topic 3 The Origins and Development of the Cold War, 1941–1950

Answer the question on the topic you have studied.

At the end of the examination, fasten all your work securely together.

The marks are given in brackets [ ] at the end of each question.
Section A: Topic 1

The Causes and Impact of British Imperialism, c.1850–1939

1 Read the extract and then answer the question.

Few of the nineteenth-century supporters and critics of Empire thought that the enterprise was without expense. Marx doubted that the Empire would ever carry its own financial weight. Disraeli, even as he proposed further imperial expansions, acknowledged that the Empire was costly and that India was a particularly expensive undertaking. Chamberlain, although he looked upon imperial expenditures as potentially profitable investments, admitted that they required money – the Empire was good business for the British, but imperial costs still had to be offset against private profits in any calculation of social gain. Even if the claim was only that the Empire was good for a few but not for the many, the question still remains: How much did it cost the many to enrich the few?

Defence was the major, but not the only, element in the British subsidy to people investing in the Empire. The failure of a long succession of governments to distribute the defence burden more fairly between home and Empire lay rooted in history, and in the pressing nature of defence requirements. In the late nineteenth century the cost of British defence was about twice that of the French and the Germans. Nor was defence the only component in the total imperial subsidy. Empire governments could borrow money from Britain at rates much below those available to non-Empire nations. The gains from this were not spread evenly over the Empire, but residents of the colonies with responsible government paid about ten percent less tax because of it, and in the dependent Empire, about half that amount. The British government also provided regular financial subsidies for administrative costs in the dependent colonies and substantial amounts on an irregular basis for individual projects. The Gold Coast received more than £400,000 in 1900, and the Ugandan railroad cost the British taxpayer almost £9 million between 1896 and 1914. To help provide the links necessary to hold the Empire together, the government found it necessary to subsidise both telegraph and steamship lines. It is difficult to measure precisely the total cost to the British of the non-defence component of the imperial subsidy, but it appears unlikely to have been less than one-fifth of the defence subsidy and it may have been twice that.

The British as a whole certainly did not benefit economically from the Empire. On the other hand, individual investors did. In the Empire itself, the level of benefits depended upon whom one asked and how they calculated. For the colonies of white settlement the answer is unambiguous. They paid for little and received a great deal. In the dependent empire, the white settlers, such as they were, almost certainly gained as well. As far as the indigenous population was concerned, there is no evidence to suggest that, had they been given a free choice, they would in any case have wanted anything that was on offer. Overall, it is clear that imperial burdens placed on British taxpayers enabled the colonists and residents of the dominions and the dependent Empire to pay fewer taxes, and to devote a substantial proportion of the taxes they did pay to a variety of projects that did not include defence or paying off their debts.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the British Empire to explain your answer. [40]
Without Jewish help in administrative and police work – the final rounding-up of Jews in Berlin was done entirely by Jewish police – there would have been either complete chaos or an impossibly severe drain on German manpower. Hence the establishing of collaborationist governments in occupied territories was always accompanied by the organisation of a central Jewish office. The members of the Jewish Councils were as a rule the locally recognised Jewish leaders, to whom the Nazis gave enormous powers – until they too were deported to Theresienstadt or Bergen-Belsen, if they were from Central or Western Europe, to Auschwitz if they were from an Eastern European community.

To a Jew this role of the Jewish leaders in the destruction of their own people is undoubtedly the darkest chapter of the whole dark story. In the matter of cooperation, there was no distinction between the highly assimilated Jewish communities of Central and Western Europe and the Yiddish-speaking masses of the East. In Amsterdam as in Warsaw, in Berlin as in Budapest, Jewish officials could be trusted to compile the lists of persons and their property, to secure money from the deportees to pay for the expenses of their deportation and extermination, to keep track of vacated apartments, to supply police forces to help seize Jews and get them on trains, until, as a last gesture, they handed over the assets of the Jewish community in good order for final confiscation. They distributed the Yellow Star badges, and sometimes, as in Warsaw, the sale of the armbands became a regular business. In the Nazi-inspired, but not Nazi-dictated, manifestos they issued, we can still sense how they enjoyed their new power – ‘The Central Jewish Council has been granted the right of absolute disposal over all Jewish spiritual and material wealth and over all Jewish manpower’, as the first announcement of the Budapest Council phrased it. We know how the Jewish officials felt when they became instruments of murder – like saviours who ‘with a hundred victims save a thousand people, with a thousand, ten thousand.’ The truth was more gruesome. In Hungary, for instance, only 1684 people survived but there were approximately 476,000 victims.

No one bothered to swear the Jewish officials to secrecy; they kept quiet either to prevent panic, or out of humane considerations, such as ‘that living in the expectation of death by gassing would only be the harder’, as in the case of Dr Leo Baeck, former Chief Rabbi of Berlin. During the Eichmann trial one witness pointed out the unfortunate consequences of this kind of ‘humanity’ – people volunteered for deportation from Theresienstadt to Auschwitz, and denounced those who tried to tell them the truth as insane. We know the characters of the Jewish leaders during the Nazi period well: they ranged all the way from Chaim Rumkowski, most important of the leaders in Lodz, who issued currency notes bearing his signature and postage stamps engraved with his portrait, and who rode around in a broken-down horse-drawn carriage; through Leo Baeck, scholarly, mild mannered, highly educated, who believed Jewish policemen would be ‘more gentle and helpful’ and ‘would make the ordeal easier’ (whereas in fact they were, of course, more brutal and less corruptible, since so much more was at stake for them); to finally, a few who committed suicide, like Adam Czerniakow, chairman of the Warsaw Jewish Council.

*What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Holocaust to explain your answer.*
The Origins and Development of the Cold War, 1941–1950

Read the extract and then answer the question.

For the fundamental source of the Cold War, we must turn to the interests and positions of nations, which are the basic unit in international politics. In a system of independent states, all nations live rather dangerously. Therefore, the reduction of dangers becomes a nation's objective in international politics. A country will take actions and pursue policies that it considers defensive, but which appear threatening to rivals. And so confrontation develops. But why did the Cold War confrontation take the shape it did? Here we must look closely at the diplomacy of the Cold War period. How world leaders perceived their interests and acted on those perceptions counted for a very great deal. The Soviet outlook was not the only significant ideological factor involved in the development of the global antagonism. There was also the American ideology – the ideas and outlook that US leaders brought to international affairs. The understanding they had of events and possibilities controlled their own actions and reactions in the confrontation.

Though the Soviet leaders spoke in the language of Marxism-Leninism, they were primarily concerned with power as traditionally conceived in the international system. They were carving a sphere of influence out of bordering countries. As they did so, a great debate developed within the American policy elite over how to evaluate Soviet intentions and capabilities. Was that sphere all Russia wanted or was it only a first step on a road to world revolution? Within the ensuing debate, there were two interpretations that competed for dominance in the American policy elite in the middle 1940s. At the heart of the first was an image of the Soviet Union as a world revolutionary state, committed to unrelenting ideological warfare, powered by a drive for world mastery. The second downplayed the role of ideology and the foreign policy consequences of Stalin's totalitarianism, and instead saw the Soviet Union behaving like a traditional Great Power within the international system, rather than trying to overthrow it. The first interpretation triumphed in American policy circles in the post-war years and provided a foundation for the anti-communist consensus. With a view of this sort, the effort to make a diplomatic settlement became irrelevant, even dangerous, for the Cold War confrontation was thought to be preordained in the revolutionary, predatory character of the Soviet Union.

Yet neither interpretation had a monopoly on the truth. Both emphasised some aspects of reality, and obscured others. No decent human being, whatever their political values, can be anything but appalled by the monstrous horrors of the Stalinist regime. I do not want to suggest that Stalin's character, intentions, or methods were, by any means, benign or kindly. But in the international arena, Stalin's politics were not those of a single-minded world revolutionist. The truth is that the Soviet Union's foreign policy was often clumsy and brutal, sometimes confused, but usually cautious and pragmatic. If the Soviet Union had harboured ambitions of unlimited expansion, it was hardly in a position to pursue them. Unlike the United States, whose gross national product had doubled during the war, it was a ruined, ravaged country in 1945. American leaders misinterpreted both the range and degree of Soviet challenge and the character of Soviet objectives and so downplayed the possibilities for diplomacy and accommodation.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Cold War to explain your answer.

[40]