HISTORY
Paper 1  Document Question 12
MARK SCHEME
Maximum Mark: 40

Published

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Generic levels of response

Part (a)

Level 4: Makes a developed comparison [12–15]
Makes a developed comparison between the two sources, recognising points of similarity and difference. Uses knowledge to evaluate the sources and shows good contextual awareness.

Level 3: Compares views and identifies similarities and differences [8–11]
Compares the views expressed in the sources, identifying differences and similarities. Begins to explain and evaluate the views using the sources and knowledge.

Level 2: Compares views and identifies similarities and/or differences [4–7]
Identifies relevant similarities or differences between views/sources and the response may be one-sided with only one aspect explained. Alternatively, both similarities and differences may be mentioned but both aspects lack development.

Level 1: Describes content of each source [1–3]
Describes or paraphrases the content of the two sources. Very simple comparisons may be made (e.g. one is from a letter and the other is from a speech) but these are not developed.

Level 0: No relevant comment on the sources or the issue [0]

Part (b)

Level 5: Evaluates the sources to reach a sustained judgement [21–25]
Answers are well focused, demonstrating a clear understanding of the sources and the question. Reaches a sustained judgement about the extent to which the sources support the statement and weighs the evidence in order to do this.

Level 4: Evaluates the sources [16–20]
Demonstrates a clear understanding of the sources and the question. Begins to evaluate the material in context, considering the nature, origin and purpose of the sources in relation to the statement. At the top of this level candidates may begin to reach a judgement but this is not sustained.

Level 3: Uses the sources to support and challenge the statement [11–15]
Makes valid points from the sources to both challenge and support the statement in the question. These comments may be derived from source content or may be about the provenance/nature of the sources.

Level 2: Uses the sources to support or challenge the statement [6–10]
Makes valid points from the sources to either support the statement in the question or to challenge it. These comments may be derived from source content or may be about the provenance/nature of the sources.

Level 1: Does not make valid use of the sources [1–5]
Describes the content of the sources with little attempt to link the material to the question. Alternatively, candidates may write an essay about the question without reference to the sources.

Level 0: No relevant comment on the sources or the issue [0]
Section A: European Option

Liberalism and Nationalism in Italy and Germany, 1815–1871

Bismarck and the Schleswig-Holstein Crisis

Indicative Content

1 (a) To what extent do Sources C and D have a similar attitude towards the consequences of the war with Denmark? [15]

Source C is a statement – whether written or spoken is unclear, as is the audience – from a leading national liberal soon after the war with Denmark. Source D is a formal resolution from a group of German liberals two years later at a time when war between Austria and Prussia was imminent. Though both sources were from liberals, they clearly saw the consequences of the war with Denmark differently. Source C welcomes the war as strengthening the power of Prussia, whereas Source D criticises the greater power of Prussia, which it maintains Prussia has abused. Source C sees Prussian power as bypassing the Austrian project for reform while Source D sees the two powers as being close to war, which hardly suggests that Austria has been bypassed. Source D was a public decision by a group of German liberals who presumably were members of the German federal parliament based there. Source D was from a liberal member of that parliament. [Droysen was a Prussian historian, though candidates cannot be expected to know that.]

Source D, a collective voice, will have a wider German perspective than would Source C, the views of one man, even if a leading liberal. Source C is an early indication of Bismarck’s ability to win over many liberals to his side because he gave them the national unity they had been seeking. The two sources are similar in that they both see the war as bringing benefits to Germany. Source C talks of the invigorating nature of ‘our victory’ over the Danes [Source C] while Source D talks of the war having ‘restored our national boundaries to us’. Who does ‘our’ refer to in each case? Examination of provenance suggests the answer is Germany, which means another similarity has been identified. However, if the ‘our’ in Source C is identified as Prussian, another difference has come to light.

(b) How far do Sources A to D support the view that Bismarck’s main aim was the expansion of Prussia? [25]

Context: Bismarck was appointed Prime Minister by the Prussian king, William I, in September 1862 in order to resolve the constitutional conflict between the king’s government and the Prussian Landtag, i.e. its parliament. His appointment was controversial. Bismarck was a conservative and strongly opposed to liberal-national groups. He soon aroused more controversy by governing without the Landtag and by making his ‘blood and iron’ speech. This speech was focused on furthering the interests of Prussia. In the next nine years Bismarck led Prussia to fight three short but significant wars which resulted in a united Germany – but excluding Austria. The war against Denmark in 1864 over the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein was the first, in which Bismarck allied with Austria to uphold the status quo against Danish plans to tie the duchies more closely to Denmark. The war was a short one as a result of which the duchies were given to Prussia and Austria jointly. Bismarck used this condominium to provoke Austria into war over the future of Germany two years later. Prussia quickly won the war and asserted its power over North Germany. Five years later, southern Germany was absorbed as well. German nationalists were delighted. Bismarck had skilfully used the power of Prussia, economic and military, to create a united Germany, behind which lay the expanded power of Prussia. The expansion of Prussia and the unification of Germany were hard to separate.
Analysis: Three sources – A, C and D – support the assertion that Bismarck’s main aim was the expansion of Prussia. Source A makes this very evident when it states that ‘Bismarck might be described as firstly, Prussian, secondly through-and-through Prussian and thirdly German through Prussian’. Though not as clear-cut, mainly because it does not explicitly mention Bismarck, Source D talks of Prussia and the Prussian government, which can only mean Bismarck. Source D makes no mention of the German dimension of the crisis. It focuses on Prussia and its expansionism, which it criticises. The Prussian state, led by Bismarck, put Prussia first, according to Source D. Source C does mention Bismarck. Droysen welcomes the expansion of Prussian power which Bismarck is bringing about. The author argues this expansion means that Prussia has become a leading state in Germany, which is further proof of Bismarck’s ambitions. Source B is the source which clearly challenges the assertion. The source, from Bismarck himself, argues that ‘we’ have acted in Denmark to uphold the existing order, which cannot mean the expansion of Prussian power.

Evaluation: Taking in turn the three sources which, at face value, support the assertion, Source A is written by a British diplomat to the British Foreign Secretary, presumably at the time when Bismarck had just been appointed Prime Minister of Prussia. A private note from a diplomat trained to be factual and unemotional in his reporting is likely to be reliable. This is supported by use of contextual knowledge to evaluate the source. Bismarck did disrespect liberal politicians, as shown by the Prussian budget crisis of 1862–66. He did achieve the ‘territorial rounding off of Prussia’ in 1866–67. He did become a danger to peace in Europe, as shown by the Hohenzollern crisis of 1870. Thus Source A can be judged as remarkably reliable in helping to decide whether Bismarck’s main aim was to expand Prussia.

Sources C and D can be considered together, given they are views expressed by elected liberal politicians. From Source A, we know that Bismarck had little or no respect for liberal politicians. Source C shows a liberal politician quick to put national success by means of war before his liberal values and thus deserving Bismarck’s disrespect. Source C’s evidence is hard to trust. A liberal has selected evidence to support a non-liberal set of initiatives, including war. Source D, by contrast, might be more reliable. It criticises the Prussian government. It sees the threat of Prussia’s military success to smaller states. It foresees the Austro-Prussian war, which they fear. The one source to challenge the assertion, Source B, is a dispatch from Bismarck to the Prussian ambassador in Vienna. The ambassador is duty-bound to convey Bismarck’s statements to the Austrian government. The last thing that Bismarck would want to say to Austria would be that he wanted to expand Prussia – which must be at Austria’s expense. So he says the opposite – that Prussia is out to uphold the existing order in Germany, to contain revolutionary forces. This fits with his conservative beliefs but not with his role as political leader of Prussia. Thus Source B is extremely unreliable. On the balance of evaluated sources, the set of extracts clearly support the assertion that Bismarck was out to expand the power of Prussia above all else.
Section B: American Option

The Origins of the Civil War, 1846–1861

The Wilmot Proviso

Indicative Content

2 (a) To what extent do Sources B and D agree about the aims of the Wilmot Proviso? [15]

Source D reads oddly when it asserts that the Wilmot Proviso aims to annihilate the black race and to depopulate the South. It does explain how the Wilmot Proviso, which would prevent the expansion of slavery into territories to be acquired from Mexico, would thereby result in huge demographic pressures in the South. The rapidly growing slave population would have to stay in the South, causing economic pressures so great that famine and depopulation would result. This is a very fanciful set of assertions. Source B makes no mention of the problems which the South might face if the Wilmot Proviso became law, which is a major difference between the two sources. Source B focuses not on the South but on the new lands to be acquired from Mexico. Even though the Wilmot Proviso had been defeated by the US Senate, Source B is confident that in time any new lands would be Free Soil rather than slave-based. The two sources are similar in that they both consider the issue of slavery in the context of newly acquired territories. They focus on completely different aspects of that issue. This contrast is probably a consequence of their different origins, North and South.

(b) How far do Sources A to D support the assertion that there was never any chance that the Wilmot Proviso would pass? [25]

Context: The Wilmot Proviso was an attempt to restrict the expansion of slavery into the territories acquired from Mexico following the war of 1846–48. It was first introduced in the House of Representatives by David Wilmot, a Northern Democrat from Pennsylvania in August 1846, three months into the war with Mexico. It was passed by the House of Representatives but rejected by the Southern-dominated Senate, both in 1846 and 1847. By 1848 the war was over and peace agreed at Guadalupe Hidalgo, where Mexico conceded huge amounts of land to the USA.

The documents refer to the second attempt to introduce the Proviso. The President of the time was James Polk, also a Democrat. He refused to endorse the Proviso. Wilmot and fellow Northern Democrats were not abolitionists. Rather they believed in the importance of Free Labor to the American way of life and saw the expansion of slavery into new territories as threatening that importance. In contrast, Southern slave owners saw a need to expand their ‘peculiar institution’ into new territories in order to preserve their position in the carefully balanced distribution of power within the USA. In this respect, the problems of the West began to widen divisions between North and South. Only with the Compromise of 1850 did North and South reach agreement about how the new lands taken from Mexico should be governed – and that Compromise was short-lived as within four years it had begun to unravel.

Analysis: Though the sources do not comment directly on the fate of the Wilmot Proviso, they do express views and reveal attitudes which show either strong opposition to or positive acceptance of the Proviso, which makes its passage either impossible or possible. Three sources support the assertion: B, C and D. Source B talks of the Proviso having been ‘killed’ in the Senate, as being ‘clearly doomed’. However, Source B goes on to argue that the failure of the US Congress to pass the Proviso is irrelevant. If the expansion of slavery has not been prohibited, neither has it been authorised. Source B argues that in reality the House
of Representatives would never support such a proposal. The defeat of the Proviso does not mean the defeat of the principle. Source C shows how the Wilmot Proviso never stood a chance simply because Southern opposition to its terms were so strong. The source argues that there needs to be either a compromise on the matter or its rejection by means of civil war. Neither allows the acceptance of the Wilmot Proviso. Source D also shows how the Proviso would never be passed because North and South had become divided on sectional lines.

Source A is the one source which suggests that there was a chance that the Wilmot Proviso might pass. It argues that the House of Representatives would never pass a law allowing the expansion of slavery, which is what was required by the US constitution. This meant that in practice the Wilmot Proviso would be implemented. In this respect, the argument of Source A is similar to that of Source B.

**Evaluation:** These sources can be evaluated either by contextual knowledge, by provenance or by cross-referencing. The context of the Wilmot Proviso was the war with Mexico, ‘Mr. Polk’s war’, as its many critics within the USA called it. Sources A, B and C mention the war. Some wars unite a country, some divide it. The war with Mexico divided the USA. Many in the North saw the war as furthering the interests of Southern Slave Power. By the 1840s slave owners wanted to expand US territories to include lands suitable for a slave-based economy. The acquisition of Texas in 1846 helped enormously. Gaining further lands in the south west from Mexico would give slavery further potential advantage. This was why Southerners took such an exception to the Wilmot Proviso, which they saw as an attempt by the North to control the post-war settlement and prevent their right to expand.

Source D is the most obvious statement of this viewpoint. Its second paragraph arguing that the Proviso is intended to annihilate the black race and depopulate the South is supported by no evidence, either from the extracts or from contextual knowledge. Source D is reliable in expressing Southern fears but completely unreliable in its analysis of the impact of the Proviso, if passed. The fears are more relevant, however, to consideration of the hypothesis that the Wilmot Proviso would never pass. It never did; Southern fears were reflected in Southern opposition in the US Senate to its passage. In this respect, Source D is reliable.

Source C is similar to Source D in that it exaggerates the consequences of the Wilmot Proviso intended by its supporters, presumably to alarm the readers of a Southern newspaper and mobilise opposition to its passage. Though Southern Senators had defeated the Proviso in March 1847, many Southerners still feared that the supporters of the Wilmot Proviso would make further attempts to get Congress to approve the exclusion of slavery from the new territories. These Southern sources can be supported by a Northern source, Source B, which states that the Wilmot Proviso had been killed in the Senate. However, Source B also talks of the principle behind the Wilmot Proviso, namely preventing the expansion of slavery, that it will not be defeated and ‘the battle is not yet fought’. Contextual knowledge of the 1850 Compromise and the Kansas-Nebraska Act would support this assertion.

Perhaps the most trustworthy source is Source A. Its statements about slavery in Mexico and the figures for the vote on the Wilmot Proviso in the House of Representatives are accurate. Admittedly, its one assertion – that Congress will never pass a law permitting slavery in the territories – is undermined by the 1850 Compromise and the concept of popular sovereignty but, on past practice, the assertion was a reasonable one to make. On balance, the evaluated sources support the assertion that there was never any chance that the Wilmot Proviso would pass.
Section C: International Option

The Search for International Peace and Security, 1919–1945

Different Interpretations of the League of Nations’ Covenant

Indicative Content

3 (a) Compare and contrast Sources A and B as evidence of American attitudes towards
joining the League of Nations. [15]

The Republican Party (Source A) was not against the concept of a League of Nations in
principle. Indeed, they argued that the USA should play a full part in international affairs,
helping to maintain world peace. However, they opposed the type of League which emerged
from the Paris peace settlement, arguing that this posed a threat to the USA’s national
independence. They argued that joining the League would, under the terms of the Covenant,
commit the USA to become involved in ‘a multitude of quarrels’, even if such involvement
was against the wishes (and interests) of the American people. Far from maintaining world
peace, they suggested that the League would inevitably lead to ‘hostility and controversy’
between nations.

Conversely, the Democrats (Source B) argued that the League of Nations was the only way
to guarantee future world peace and that the USA’s international prestige and power could
only be enhanced by becoming a member. For the USA not to join the League would be
detrimental, both to the prospects of future world peace and to America’s own national
interests. They contested the Republican claim that, by agreeing to the Covenant, the USA
would be obligated to become involved in international issues (including war) against its will –
the USA would not be obliged to take any action without the express approval of Congress,
thereby maintaining its national independence and integrity.

The Republicans, who gained overall control of the Senate in early 1919, were heavily critical
of President Wilson, both for his conduct of the USA’s involvement in WWI and,
subsequently, for his negotiations at the Paris peace settlement. They branded him as an
idealist, arguing that his desire to place the USA at the forefront of international affairs would
undermine America’s national interests. Some Republicans, believing that the best way to
ensure that the USA was not involved in another major war, argued that there should be a
return to isolationism; they opposed the concept of a League of Nations entirely. Other
Republicans were prepared to accept the notion of a League of Nations, but only on
condition that there was a fundamental re-drafting of the Covenant. As a group, the
Republican Party opposed the Treaty of Versailles and argued that the USA should make a
separate treaty with Germany.

Wilson’s Democrats argued that the USA was a major world power and, as such, had both a
responsibility and a vested interest in being actively involved in international affairs. The
Democratic Party platform (manifesto) was published almost three weeks after that of the
Republicans – this gave the Democrats time to evaluate and contest the Republicans’
criticisms of both the League of Nations and the Treaty of Versailles in general.

While there were clearly political reasons for the major disagreement between Republicans
and Democrats regarding the League of Nations, much of the debate relates to their different
interpretations of the Covenant. Reading the Articles (especially 10 and 16) literally, the
Republicans argued that the USA would be obliged to take action (for example, economic or
even military sanctions) in line with any decision made by the League. Wilson and the
Democrats argued that the Articles did not impose such an obligation and that the USA
American public opinion was unconvinced by Wilson’s reassurances regarding the impact of the USA’s membership of the League of Nations on its national independence. The presidential elections of 1920 resulted in a landslide Republican victory.

(b) How far do Sources A to D support the view that the League of Nations’ Covenant threatened the independence of member states? [25]

Context: The Covenant of the League of Nations was drawn up and agreed by WWI’s victorious allies during the Paris peace conference. Its aim was to ensure future world peace and security by upholding the territorial decisions laid down by the Paris peace treaties and encouraging mutual cooperation and understanding between nations. League members were pledged to work together (collective security) to oppose unwarranted aggression. This is particularly evident in Articles 10 and 16. The League would confront unwarranted aggression with economic sanctions and, in extreme cases, collective military action. Member states which failed to follow the League’s decisions regarding collective action against a particular case of aggression would be faced with expulsion from the League.

The key issue relates to how the Articles of the Covenant were interpreted. The USA, taking the wording of the Articles literally, believed that they imposed an obligation on a member state to take action in line with the League’s decisions regardless of its own opinions on a particular issue and even if such action was against its national interests. Britain adopted a less literal interpretation, arguing that the League’s decisions were recommendatory and that the governments of member states maintained the right to make the final decision on what, if any, action to take.

Analysis: In support of the hypothesis – The US Republican Party (Source A) believed that, in signing the Covenant, the USA would be sacrificing its political integrity and independence. The USA would be obliged to join other League members in taking collective action against nations accused of unwarranted aggression. This, the Republicans argued, would undermine both the rights of the American people and the political power of Congress. Source D agrees with the American interpretation of the Articles of the Covenant. It describes the Covenant as imposing a ‘compulsory obligation’, forcing member states to take action in line with the League’s decisions, regardless of the merits of each individual case. Such an obligation would clearly undermine the political independence of member states. Source D is heavily critical of the obligatory nature of the Articles, suggesting that this is why some countries have decided not to join the League. It argues that individual countries should be able to make their own decisions in each particular case, rather than being forced to abide by the League’s decisions.

In challenging the hypothesis – The Democratic Party (Source B) strongly contests the Republican ‘assumption’ that accepting the Covenant would undermine the political independence of the USA. It argues that the USA’s response to every decision taken by the League would be determined by Congress in line with the Constitution of the USA. The USA would be under no obligation to blindly accept every decision by the League. It points out that the 29 countries which agreed to the Covenant in Paris would not have done so if it meant sacrificing their right to make their own independent decisions regarding each individual case confronting the League of Nations. Source C agrees with this interpretation, arguing that Britain joined the League because it believed (‘and believed rightly’) that the Covenant did not commit Britain to take action which it did not want to take. If the Covenant forced Britain to take action in line with the League’s decisions regardless of its own opinions, the British people would immediately wish to withdraw from it.
Evaluation:

As an election manifesto, source A is clearly politically motivated. While Wilson was away in Paris, the Republicans had made a concerted effort to convince American public opinion that ratifying the Treaty of Versailles in general, and the League of Nations in particular, was not in the USA's best interests. They derided Wilson as an idealist, arguing that the League would lead to conflict rather than agreement between countries. They argued that joining the League would impose obligations on the USA, leading to American interference in the affairs of other countries. Moreover, other countries would have the opportunity to meddle in the internal affairs of the USA. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge was the most vociferous in his attacks on Wilson, the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations. To the Republicans, the best way for the USA to protect its own interests, while at the same time encouraging international peace, was to return to a policy of isolationism. In particular, this was the best way of avoiding the USA becoming embroiled in another major war. This policy appealed to the American people, for whom involvement in WWI had become increasingly unpopular.

Source B is a politically motivated source. On his return from Paris, Wilson had embarked on an extensive tour of the USA in an attempt to convince the American people that the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations were very much in the USA's best interests. The Democratic Party published its manifesto almost three weeks after the Republicans issued theirs, and it makes a clear attempt to convince the American electorate that the Republican fears regarding the League of Nations’ Covenant are unfounded. Emotively, it claims that the USA's international power and prestige would be adversely affected if the country did not play a leading role in the League. Wilson's heavy defeat in the 1920 presidential election shows that he failed to convince the American people.

Source C is written by Britain’s most senior naval officer, Source C has great credibility in terms of its assessment of why Britain joined the League. In much the same way as the Democratic Party's election manifesto of 1920, it dismisses the US Republican fears as unfounded and based on a too literal interpretation of the Covenant’s Articles. The source is clearly in favour of the League, but only on condition that member states retain their independent political rights. The second part of the source might indicate that there had, by 1923, been moves to clarify the Articles of the Covenant, adding in some element which might force member states to take action in response to the League’s decisions. The source clearly opposes such a move and argues that the British people would not accept it. As a senior military commander, the writer would expect to take orders from his country’s government rather than the more nebulous authority of the League of Nations. [In fact, this source was written in response to Cecil’s draft Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, which would, in effect, oblige member states of the League to take collective action in line with the League’s decisions.]

As an article in a magazine, source D reflects the views of the writer rather than those of the British government. The writer’s interpretation of the Covenant is much the same as that of the US Republican Party – that it did impose an obligation on the part of member states to support the League’s decisions regardless of their own national interests and opinions. It argues that this obligation is the reason why some countries refuse to join the League, clearly a reference to the USA. It suggests that the obligatory nature of the Articles was not in the best interests of the League and should be removed, giving each member state the right to determine what action to take in each individual case confronting the League of Nations. The writer agrees with Source C that obliging countries to blindly follow the League’s decisions is wrong, but while Source C is concerned that this might happen, Source D claims that it already has because it is implicit in the Covenant.

Source D reflects the British government’s view that the League of Nations could only work if all member countries were fully committed. It rejects the reservations issued by the US...
Senate, arguing that they would destroy the whole concept of the League. The British government was clearly hoping that Wilson would be able to overturn the opposition of the Senate. The tone of the memorandum implies that Britain believed the League could not be established successfully without the USA’s full and unreserved commitment.