Cambridge Assessment International Education
Cambridge International Advanced Subsidiary and Advanced Level

HISTORY

Paper 3 Interpretations Question

October/November 2019
1 hour

No Additional Materials are required.

READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

An answer booklet is provided inside this question paper. You should follow the instructions on the front cover of the answer booklet. If you need additional answer paper ask the invigilator for a continuation booklet.

This paper contains three sections:
Section A: Topic 1 The Causes and Impact of British Imperialism, c.1850–1939
Section B: Topic 2 The Holocaust
Section C: Topic 3 The Origins and Development of the Cold War, 1941–1950

Answer the question on the topic you have studied.

At the end of the examination, fasten all your work securely together.
The marks are given in brackets [ ] at the end of each question.
Section A: Topic 1

The Causes and Impact of British Imperialism, c.1850–1939

1 Read the extract and then answer the question.

At the broadest level, one can say that during the nineteenth century East Africa was in the process of being drawn into an Indian Ocean ‘world system’ – itself already less and less an Asian system and one more and more controlled by European capitalism – at a time when Europeans, and especially the British, were taking a more direct part in that process. The reasons for this need not be seen as being directly economic ones. In fact the process was a very complex one involving a variety of peoples with a variety of different objectives. There were other Europeans, Arabs from Oman, Indians, Swahili from the East African coast itself and other Africans. From the 1850s onwards, what gave the British an actual or a potentially dominant position were five key factors which it is worth listing.

First of all there was knowledge – real and assumed. Among the assumptions was the belief that Europeans could understand and, if necessary, transform the environment as well as the political and economic condition of the people. This resulted from the examination of the region by a succession of British explorers. Exploration also went a considerable way towards giving East Africa and its problems a place in the consciousness of British people. To some extent connected with this because of the way the effort was directed, was the tremendous missionary drive by British Protestant churches – which is the second factor. Thirdly, British authorities had developed a semi-official hold over Zanzibar and its Sultan. In origin, this hold was by Indian authorities for Indian reasons but increasingly this stake in East Africa became the concern of the metropolitan government. However, the new developments had tended to show how little real power the Sultan of Zanzibar had even, sometimes, over his fellow Arabs. The new situation was, of course, partly a result of the fourth factor – the increasing number of direct contacts with the peoples of the mainland by unofficial British organisations, above all the missionaries. Finally, and in many senses underpinning all the other factors, was the economic impetus of the British. Even if the search for future opportunities seemed more important than the expectation of immediate gain, British wealth made the search possible. It is this search that brought together in various direct and indirect ways, Indian officials, metropolitan officials, and many other members of a service class together with missionaries and some commercial men. Their object was to create British empire of a kind but this did not have to mean formal empire.

The unofficial empire which Britain’s advantages enabled it to build up in East Africa was a rather haphazard affair and was dependent upon a great variety of possible influences. Nevertheless, in the 1870s, certain figures can be seen to have been attempting to give this unofficial empire more shape and direction, especially as far as transport and certain other infrastructural features were concerned. The ‘German irruption’ from the 1880s did not destroy the pattern of British influence which was being built up, although it gave it several shocks. From Britain’s perspective, the 1886 and 1890 treaties between the two countries were designed as much as anything to save the unofficial empire. This does not necessarily mean that wider strategic or national concerns were absent from the ‘official mind’, but it seems reasonable to assume that such factors did not become absolutely important until the 1890s, when as most commentators agree, all the metropolitan powers’ governments felt it necessary to act with greater firmness and more directly in the peripheral regions where their nationals claimed a stake.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the British Empire to explain your answer. [40]
Section B: Topic 2

The Holocaust

2 Read the extract and then answer the question.

According to Field-Marshal Keitel, it was at the beginning of December 1940 that Hitler first ordered plans for an invasion of Russia, but the General Staff were not assured of its imminence till March 1941. The actual Führer Order for the execution of Jews, Gypsies, racial inferiors, ‘asocials’ and Soviet political commissars, was communicated in stages to those responsible for its execution. Keitel recollected a conference at Hitler’s headquarters in the first half of March 1941, where Himmler was given extensive powers, covering all police actions which would become necessary in the occupied territory. A broad hint of these ‘police actions’ was conveyed by Keitel himself in a High Command instruction dated 13 March 1941: ‘By order of the Führer, the Reichsführer SS (i.e. Himmler) has been given special tasks, arising from the conclusive and decisive struggle between the two opposing political systems. Within the limits of the set tasks the Reichsführer SS acts independently on his own authority.’ At a conference on 30 March, Keitel revealed to the army commanders that they would have to execute political commissars who fell into their hands, or else hand them over to the Gestapo. Did the army commanders also learn of the order to exterminate Jews? Halder, who as Chief of Staff kept the most careful minutes of Keitel’s conference, made no such entry.

The part of the Führer Order concerning the execution of Jews was never put on paper and even those to whom it was passed were not all informed at the same time. Three of the SS extermination group commanders got their orders in June, one from Heydrich’s personal office, while two others were briefed in the course of a lecture, given by Heydrich to a select audience. But another of these commanders swore that he only learnt of this part of the Führer Order when serving in Russia at the end of August 1941, at which time massacres of Jews had begun on all sectors of the front. The statement by Victor Brack, organiser of the T4 Euthanasia Programme, that these matters were ‘no secret in higher Party circles’ by March 1941, is undermined by the fact that this was his defence for having written to Himmler on the 28 March advocating mass sterilisation; but there is a strong suspicion that soon after the first conferences on the Führer Order, its full nature and implications were known to Göring. On 20 May a circular was despatched by Eichmann’s office, the Jewish section of the Gestapo, warning all German consulates that Göring had banned voluntary emigration by Jews from France and Belgium, because ‘the Final Solution of the Jewish problem is undoubtedly close at hand’. Göring had been responsible since January 1939 for Heydrich’s brief to evacuate Jews from the Reich. Any extension of Heydrich’s brief demanded a fresh brief from Göring, and in this case (the intended mass deportation to Russia of all Jews in German hands), we possess a copy. It is dated 31 July 1941 and includes the following: ‘Submit to me as soon as possible a draft showing the administrative, material and financial measures already taken for the execution of the intended final solution of the Jewish question.’ At the Nuremberg trials, Göring was not pressed on what exactly was meant by this document. He said it meant not a final solution but a total solution to the Jewish Question, and he was allowed to get away with this.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Holocaust to explain your answer. [40]
Section C: Topic 3

The Origins and Development of the Cold War, 1941–1950

3 Read the extract and then answer the question.

In ideological terms, the Cold War presented itself as a world-wide contest between liberal democracy and Communism. The official Communist goal was the liberation of mankind from capitalist oppression. Ideologically minded Westerners interpreted this as signifying that Moscow was trying to impose its own authoritarian system on the world. Americans, for their part, had traditionally looked forward to the liberation of mankind from the oppression of autocracy, and to the consequent establishment of their own liberal system throughout the world. To the ideologists in Moscow this meant that ‘the imperialist ruling circles’ in America were trying to enslave mankind under the domination of Wall Street.

The ideological view, however, is in essence based on myths. The grand objectives that go with it are little more than theoretical. They are not, in any case, objectives to which the daily operations of government are actually directed. At no time was the operative policy of Moscow directed in any immediate or meaningful sense toward the objective of a single classless society encircling the globe.

This is not to say that ideology did not make a difference. It made a great difference. Not only did it constantly threaten to draw the makers of policy into foolish and dangerous adventures, it gave a mythic justification to their distrust of the outside world; it gave them a sense of mission; it gave a cover of respectability for political practices that might have seemed shameful. In the long run, however, what generally determined the operating policy of the United States, as of Soviet Russia, was its own vital interests in a world of power politics. In practice neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was set on establishing its rule over the earth. Each, however, could be represented, with a certain show of plausibility, as seeking to do so. The Cold War would tend to be difficult and unlimitable to the extent that each side allowed itself to be distracted by the ideological questions at issue, subordinating the real, strategic questions.

All ideologically minded societies have aims that are absolute and universal. These aims may not be intended for application in the real world. The proclamation of the Truman Doctrine is an example. In 1947 it was the expansion of the Soviet Union in Europe that had upset the balance of power, and that represented a mortal danger to the Atlantic community of which the USA and Canada were the only non-disabled members. The immediate danger was in Europe, not in the Pacific or South Asia or Africa. It was the situation in Europe that called for containment. Nevertheless, what the Truman Doctrine said was that ‘it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities.’ This concept was simpler and grander than that of containing Russia’s expansion only; but it was also less practicable. Taken literally, it applied to the whole world. It could only exaggerate the fear of encirclement that haunted Moscow. Who could say that it did not mean the use of the atom bomb to enforce the American conception of freedom around the globe? Americans knew that it intended no such thing, but the Russians had a less good-natured view of American character and intentions.

We must distinguish, then, between the conflict represented by ideology, which was global and at best secondary, and the real conflict, which was over the balance of power in Europe.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Cold War to explain your answer. [40]